Christopher Howarth is a senior Political
Analyst at the think tank Open Europe. Prior to Open Europe he worked as a
Conservative Foreign Affairs Adviser and senior researcher to a Shadow Europe
Minister. Follow Open Europe on Twitter.
The last 40 years of
British Isles political history could be characterised as the history of two
Unions: The Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the European Union
straddling both the Republic of Ireland and the UK. As a result of these two
unions we have unhindered cross border traffic between England and Scotland,
and across the island of Ireland. We take this for granted, but should we? The
referendum on Scottish independence, set for 2014, and a potential Conservative
referendum on UK membership of the EU shake these assumptions and pose
interesting questions for the SNP, Ireland and unionists. These three groups
have always seen the two unions rather differently.
Firstly, the Republic
of Ireland. When the UK joined what became the EU the Republic of Ireland followed
suit. From an Irish viewpoint the EU was a tempting prospect; generous
subsidies and the promise of an environment where small states could gain real
independence from, and equality with, their larger neighbours. The decision to
join the Euro again seemed clear-cut. The Irish Punt dominated by Sterling
could be exchanged for a currency over which Ireland would be a shareholder.
With Tony Blair promising to fix UK entry into the Euro all seemed settled:
they would have a currency shared with their trade partners in both continental
and UK Europe. However, Tony Blair did not take the UK into the euro and the
eurocrisis has unpicked the logic that euro entry would lead to more ‘independence’.
Ireland’s economy – subject to an EU bailout – is now overseen by a Troika and
ultimately the Bundestag.
Secondly, the SNP.
They have, in the past, followed Ireland’s logic arguing that EU membership
makes Scotland’s independence a plausible and practical proposition. If the UK
had joined the euro, an independent Scotland could have shared a currency as well
as a passport and customs-free border with England. Now it is virtually certain
the UK will not join the Euro, Scotland’s nationalists are in a twist – sharing a common
currency (be it Sterling or the Euro) over which you have little or no
influence does not guarantee ‘independence’ as Ireland has found out. But they have other problems. What terms would an
independent Scotland gain in its EU accession negotiations? Could it gain a
euro opt out and could it preserve its passport-free travel with the UK by
remaining outside the Schengen free travel area? Could Scotland benefit from
David Cameron’s attempts at EU reform? Could it even avoid a Spanish veto and be in the EU at all? And in the longer
term will the UK actually be in the EU? These questions all cast doubt over the
SNP’s plans for independence.
Thirdly, unionists in
Scotland and the remainder of the UK. At some point there could be a UK
referendum on EU membership and therefore a possibility, at least, that the UK
could decide to leave the EU. The focus now is on what deal can be negotiated
prior to a referendum but some British Isles issues should also be raised.
Firstly, would a non-EU UK be able to keep the Northern Irish border passport
and customs-free? Ireland and the UK have their own common travel area (a
mini-Schengen), meaning both states need a Schengen opt out. This could
conceivably continue if the UK was out of the EU and Ireland in, (although as
former Irish PM John Bruton has
pointed out it would make the policing of the onwards travel of EU
jobseekers exercising their right to move to Ireland complicated), but keeping
the Northern Irish border customs-free would however be impossible due to the
external EU tariff wall.
But perhaps the
Republic of Ireland would also chose to leave the EU if the UK left. This seems
unlikely, not least because it is in the euro and subject to a bailout
programme. However, for Ireland both UK EU withdrawal and/or Scottish
Independence would still be a disaster. The UK being outside the EU
would make their trade with their largest trading partner more complicated –
with a new customs border – and Scottish independence would (like UK
withdrawal) also have the potential to destabilise Northern Ireland.
could be an independent Scotland leaving the EU, followed by the UK. In this
situation, if both states were outside the EU, they could agree their own
UK/Scotland customs union and (if Ireland agreed) allow Scotland to join the
Common Travel area thus preserving the passport-free travel area. There is a
subsidiary question as to what would happen to Northern Ireland if Scotland
left the UK – would Northern Ireland stick with the UK or seek independence or
even join Scotland? This seems unclear but whatever the answer this could lead
to unwanted instability.
So how do these
considerations this fit with Conservative policy?
on the UK is clear – to persuade Scottish voters to stay. This is the right
policy and persuasion is far preferable to say Spain’s less gentle approach
towards Catalonia. As preserving the UK is undoubtedly more important than
preserving the EU some may ask whether, in the long term, Scottish independence
would be more or less likely if the UK left the EU. Although a non-EU UK would
make Scottish independence more complicated and less plausible, it is best to
win the case for the Union on its merits (the referendum on the EU will in any
event come after the Scottish 2014 referendum). The priority should be on
making the 2014 vote a final vote. If Scottish independence is not closed down
as an issue an EU referendum could even have the potential to complicate things
– say, if Scotland votes to stay in the EU and England votes to leave. The
Government seems to be doing this, but at times can fall in Salmond’s trap by
allowing for a continuation of a discussion on independence and weakening the
Union via further devolution even after a No vote (The SNP will say Scotland
only voted to stay in the UK on David Cameron’s vague promise of more power).
policy of renegotiating a better EU deal, which could allow the UK to stay in
the EU on terms the people are happy with, also has its plus-points for those
wishing to preserve the UK. What for instance would the SNP say to Scottish
small businesses and taxpayers when explaining that leaving the UK would mean –
not just a chance of leaving the EU – but, at the very least, leaving behind
not only the benefits of the UK’s existing EU budget rebate and EU justice opt-outs,
but also a potential new UK deal in areas such as social policy, fisheries and
financial services? If the UK negotiates for itself a better EU deal an
independent Scotland would not get the benefit of it.