Scotland may vote Yes. Or it may vote No by a substantial majority (say 60/40). But the majority of recent polls have shown a narrow No lead.
So let me temporarily suspend the rule that a poll is a snapshot and not a forecast – because the consequences of a close No are so intriguing as to make speculation irresistible.
Those of a Yes vote are some ways imponderable. Those of a decisive No vote are more predictable: the push for a new constitutional settlement will lose momentum.
Those of a marginal No hover somewhere between the two. They are cloudy – but not completely obscure. Let us turn to them.
A narrow No would be read, correctly, as showing that the unbalanced Blair/Brown devolution settlement – which has been unjust to all parts of the United Kingdom, not least England – is dead. Scotland would be judged to have rejected not only independence but also the status quo, and a majority of Scottish voters to back more devolution for the country.
Like the other main party leaders, David Cameron has endorsed Gordon Brown’s offer of a form of devo-plus for Scotland – in very short order. According to George Osborne, this will come “within days” of a No vote, although the Chancellor was referring to a constitutional convention apparently consisting of the those main parties rather than an actual proposal.
The only fair outcome of such a convention, and the greater devolution for Scotland that would flow from it, would be an end to MPs from Scotland voting on non-Scottish Parliamentary business in their present number. That number could be slashed back, as a rough quid-pro-quo for this more extensive devolution. Or they could be barred from voting on non-Scottish business altogether.
On balance, this site favours the latter solution – that’s to say, devo-max for all the home nations, as our manifesto puts it. This federal-type solution is not without its difficulties. Controversial decisions would have to be taken about what exactly constitutes non-Scottish business – perhaps by the Speaker, which gives pause for thought.
Furthermore, it would be certain that, at some point in the electoral future, the UK would return a Labour Government (which would duly have charge of foreign affairs and defence) and England would return a Conservative one (which would control most tax, public services, and so on). This would be problematic. But the federal-shaped solution is now the least bad practicable option.
The Prime Minister would thus have three main Parliamentary constituencies to square:
In the event of a close No vote, the constitutional choice that Cameron will face is essentially one between Labour, perhaps supported tby the Liberal Democrats, and his own Party. It’s a no-brainer – not least because its confidence in him has been further eroded by his handling of the referendum.
But it’s also a no-brainer because what would be right for his Party would also be right for the country – and unavoidable, in any event. There would be no going back to the pre-1997 constitutional settlement. There would be no staying with the discredited Blair/Brown devolution halfway house.
The federal solution, with the four parts of the UK each having more devolution, would loom. Its peoples would require a big say: there’s no way a new settlement could simply be cobbled together simply by the Westminster elites.
The Lords would have to be re-thought. It is hard to see how the new deal could not be formalised in a written constitution.
Heady days.